We use slave voyage data from 18th century Great Britain and France to answer two questions: 1) How important was the managerial quality of owners and captains in slave trading? and 2) What explains the substantial variation in managerial quality? Utilizing the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, in which we observe the performance of owners and captains in each of their voyages, we estimate the value-added of owners and captains to slave voyage output, i.e. the number of slaves arriving in the Americas. Several results emerge. First, if we replace all owners with the 90th percentile owner in the country, slave voyage output would be 16% and 21% higher than if we replaced all owners with the 10th percentile owner in Great Britain and in France. This 90/10 ratio is 1.22 for British captains. If we replace all owners with their country's 90th percentile owner, approximately 217,000 more slaves would have been exported over the course of the 18th century. Likewise, if all British captains were replaced with the 90th percentile captain, approximately 211,000 more slaves would have been exported. Second, owner value-added is negatively associated with family businesses and positively associated with the level of competition. A comparison of owner value-added before and after the unexpected outbreak of the Seven Years' War, which historians suggest decreased (increased) competition in the French (British) slave trade, suggests competition's effect on owner value-added might be causal.
Introduction
Not all countries and firms were equally productive participants in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Eltis and Richardson (1995) , for example, show total factor productivity (TFP) was higher in the British than in the French slave trade industry. Dalton and Leung (2015) find large productivity variation within the slave trade industries of Great Britain, France, and Portugal. What explains the observed differences in productivity, even after controlling for technology and the level of inputs, such as capital and labor? Many economists have long thought managerial quality drives productivity differences, but data limitations regarding managers and management practices have led to a dearth of empirical findings (Syverson 2011) .
1 These constraints are less severe for the historical case of the trans-Atlantic slave trade given the richness of the data available in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. This paper examines one determinant of the slave trade by quantifying the contribution of managerial quality on the supply of slaves. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so.
Specifically, we ask how important are the fixed effects of managerial quality? And, what explains the substantial variation in managerial quality? To answer these questions, we study the value-added of owners and captains to slave voyage output, measured as the number of slaves disembarked, during the trans-Atlantic slave trade in Great Britain and France during the 18th century. 2 In their capacities as managers, both owners and captains performed a variety of tasks influencing the outcomes of a slave voyage. From securing financing for the voyage to assembling ship and crew, especially the all-important decision about who to hire as captain, owners exerted influence over the slave trade from their positions in European ports. Once the voyage was underway, a captain's knowledge of markets in Africa and the Americas and his 1 management of the vessel determined the success of the voyage and how many enslaved Africans disembarked in the New World. Stein (1979, p. 66-67) captures the historian's view as follows:
"Choosing a captain was not a decision to be undertaken lightly, for no single person besides the armateur [or owner] himself had as much influence over the expedition's ultimate success as did the captain."
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Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we make use of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Database to identify unique owners in Great Britain and France who have owned multiple slave voyages. Compared to the standard plant-level or firm-level data which document the overall performance of the plant or firm in a particular time period (say, a year), our data record the performance of an owner and captain in each task or production run, i.e. a slave voyage.
In the second step of our analysis, we use the data on the different voyages to estimate owner and captain value-added to slave voyage output. While we are not able to quantitatively trace the management practices serving as sources of owner value-added to slave voyage outputs, we find that if we replace all owners with the 90th percentile owner in the country, slave voyage output would be 16% and 21% higher than if we replaced all owners with the 10th percentile owner in Great Britain and in France, respectively. If we replace all owners in Great Britain and France with their respective 90th percentile owner, our estimates imply nearly 217,000 more enslaved Africans would have been exported over the course of the 18th century in the combined trade. Our sample only represents 56% of the recorded slaves exported by the British and French during the 18th century, which means, if our estimates are unbiased, the number of slaves exported under the 90th percentile owner would be nearly double. These results suggest owners played a significant role in determining how many slaves arrived in the Americas during the trans-Atlantic slave trades.
Third, we test whether slave owner value-added is associated with some of the owners' characteristics and the market structure, which we find is the case in both an economically and statistically significant way. In particular, our value-added estimates are negatively associated with family businesses and positively associated with the competition level. We use the unexpected outbreak of the Seven Years' War, which historians suggest decreased (increased) the market size for French (British) owners and, therefore, decreased (increased) competition in the French (British) slave trade (Holmes and Schmitz 2010) , to show that competition has a causal impact on owner value-added. Insofar as the slave trade industry provides a window into the British and French economies at the time, our results suggest managerial quality, driven by competition, mattered significantly for firm outcomes.
We also use the same approach to quantify the value-added of British slave captains who have captained multiple slave voyages in our data. 4 The 90/10 ratio for British captains is 1.22.
If we replace all British captains by the 90th percentile captain, our estimates imply nearly 211,000 more slaves would have been exported from Africa during the 18th century. We find captain value-added is also significantly associated with family businesses and market structure.
Since our estimation technique relies on underlying data from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Database, including ship tonnage, which is our measure of the capital input of a voyage, we need to address the concerns raised by Solar and Duquette (2017) about this variable in the database. Solar and Duquette (2017) present a detailed discussion laying out the problems associated with these data, which, in short, revolve around inappropriate adjustments used to construct standardized tonnages. The authors show their preferred measure of British tonnage from Lloyd's Registers lies between the lower bound of unstandardized tonnage and the upper bound of standardized tonnage during the years 1763-1786. After the passage of the British Ship Registration Act of 1786, the discrepancies between the series largely go away. Solar and Duquette (2017) show the choice of tonnage matters in the case of ship crowding and slave mortality and caution researchers about the use of the tonnage data. To mitigate concerns over our tonnage variable, we conduct our analysis using both the unstandardized and standardized tonnage variables, which act as lower and upper bounds on our capital input. Given the fewer concerns with the unstandardized tonnage variable, we present those results throughout the paper and confine those using the standardized tonnage to a limited number of places where it is fruitful to make the comparison and understand how the tonnage variable affects our results.
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Although the concern over the tonnage variable is valid, it does not change the main point of our paper, i.e. successfully quantifying and showing the important role played by owners 4 The data prevent us from calculating estimates for French captains.
5 Of course, all our results using the standardized tonnage are available upon request.
3 and captains on slave voyage outcomes, as we can always restrict our analysis to the post-1786
period.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the study of the African slave trades, in particular on factors impacting the demand and supply dynamics of the trade. These factors include geography, such as rugged terrain (Nunn and Puga 2012) ; climate change and natural disaster (Boxell 2015 , Fenske and Kala 2015 , Hartwig 1979 , Miller 1982 ; the "raid or be raided" arms race initiated by the gun-slave cycle (Whatley 2018) ; distortions in product and input markets (Dalton and Leung 2015) ; and political conflict among ethnic groups (Curtin 1975 , Engerman, Genovese, and Adamson 1975 , Thornton 1998 , Klein 1999 , Thomas 1997 . Our paper contributes to this literature on the demand and supply dynamics of the slave trade by quantifying the role played by owner and captain value-added on the supply of slaves.
In the remainder of the paper, we develop our analysis as follows: We begin in Section 2 by describing the historical background of the slave trade with a focus on the managerial roles played by owners and captains in a typical voyage. Section 3 describes the data used in our empirical analysis. We then construct our empirical model and present the results in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
Historical Background
Owners and captains filled the two most important management roles in conducting a slave voyage. In this section, we provide historical background on the tasks involved in fulfilling each of these management roles and show their importance in determining the overall success of the voyage. We argue the qualitative historical evidence suggests the managerial quality of owners and captains played a significant role in influencing the number of Africans disembarked in the Americas. Owners oversaw the organization of slave voyages in European ports from the highest level. Their primary tasks involved securing financial backing and working out the mechanics of the voyage, such as securing a ship and assembling a crew. Captains helped prepare aspects of the voyage in port, but they gained complete control once sailing began. Through their knowledge of markets in Africa and the Americas, navigation experience, role in determining ship hygiene, and maintaining order on board the ship, captains influenced the success of a 4 voyage and the number of slaves exported from Africa.
Owners
Organizing a slave voyage was a complex and time consuming task. 6 Owners typically brought with them years of experience in maritime commerce before engaging in the slave trade, though, and some owners were previously captains of a slave voyage themselves or the sons of captains.
The variation in experience would have contributed to variation in owners' managerial quality.
Market structure and the level of competition would have impacted both the level of and variation in owners' managerial quality. Since market power insulates firms from competition, entry into the slave trade and the overall managerial quality of owners could have suffered in the presence of market restrictions. Indeed, much of the period of the slave trades can be characterized by well-documented mercantilist policies imposed by various European states, a point discussed in Eltis and Richardson (1995) and Dalton and Leung (2015) . In these types of economies, owners with close connections to royal families and the state would be in more advantageous positions than owners without such connections. The degree of mercantilist polices varied across Great Britain and France. For example, the Royal African Company lost its monopoly on the British slave trades at the end of the 17th century, whereas state monopolies, such as the Compagnie des Indes, only gradually lost market power in the French slave trades over the first half of the 18th century. The French slave trades were also characterized by the Acquits de Guinée, an elaborate subsidy system, and the Compagnie du Sénégal maintained monopoly rights over exporting slaves from Senegambia. Thomas (1997, p. 292) goes so far as to assert "the prime mover in the slaving business was the state."
An owner's first order of business was to secure financial backing for the voyage. The slave trade was an expensive and risky undertaking, so owners needed substantial resources at their disposal. Differential access to capital markets gave rise to variation across owners and the size of the voyages they were able to undertake. Dalton and Leung (2015) show differential access to capital markets contributed to resource misallocation, and, thus, TFP losses, in the slave trade. In the case of French owners, Stein (1979) points out the owner's relation to bankers in Paris played an important role in the owner's ability to finance voyages. Owners also often sold shares in the voyage, so they required the marketing skills necessary to lure in interested investors. The most important resource for financing voyages would have been the owner's family. Arrangements between father and son, brother and brother, and in-laws were common, not only for financing but also for organizing the voyage as a whole. Thomas (1997, p. 296) notes, "The most frequent type of association, in Liverpool as in Newport, in Nantes as in Rio, leading to a slave voyage was one of relations, the only tie which could be trusted to endure.
So the slave trade seemed, to a great extent, a thing of families..." Although family businesses were clearly important for financing voyages, not having access to these networks could have formed a barrier to entry to potential owners, which then could have decreased overall owners' managerial quality in the slave trade.
Once financing was underway, owners turned their attention to the mechanical aspects of the voyage, which, as Stein (1979, p. 66) 
Captains
Once a slave voyage was underway, captains performed a variety of tasks as managers ( (Thomas 1997, p. 307 ):
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The captain had to be a man of parts. He was the heart and soul of the whole voyage, and had to be able, above all, to negotiate prices of slaves with African merchants or kings, strong enough to survive the West African climate and to stand storms, calms, and loss of equipment. He had to have the presence of mind to deal with 7 The word armateur used here refers to the French owner of the slave voyage. 8 Our discussion here in Section 2.2 expands on our brief discussion of captains in Dalton and Leung (2015) .
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difficult crews who might jump ship, and he had to be ready to face, coolly and with courage, slave rebellions.
A captain's managerial quality, thus, influenced the outcomes of the slave voyage, like profits and the number of slaves disembarked in the Americas. Behrendt (1991) stresses the importance of captains in the slave trade relative to other trades: "More than any other trade, the slave merchants' profits depended on the captain's ability." The prominent role played by captains in the slave trade may be due to the nature of the human cargo, which required larger crews to handle. 9 Crowded ship conditions proved deadly for many enslaved Africans, slave rebellions on board were a constant threat, and interactions between crew members and slaves caused tension. Coupling these unique conditions with the normal attributes of a captain, like knowledge of navigation and expertise in trading on the African coast, the importance of a captain's managerial quality becomes clear.
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Captains' decisions began in the ports of Europe, as they often oversaw the preparations for a slave voyage, including the important question of what mix of cargo to load on board to exchange for slaves on the African coast (Postma 1990) . In order to best answer this question, captains required detailed knowledge of the demand conditions in Africa. Such knowledge impacted voyage outcomes not only through its effect on the price paid for slaves but also because it partly determined the time required to purchase and load slaves from the African coast. The more time spent on the African coast purchasing and loading slaves, the longer some slaves would spend on the ship, which lengthened their exposure to crowding and shipborne illnesses. Hogerzeil and Richardson (2007) show that the death rates during loading are around 204 per 1,000 person-years. Likewise, as Behrendt (1991) points out, captains required knowledge of the 9 Behrendt (2007) discusses the increased crew sizes for British slave voyages in the following passage:
...the peculiar trade in human cargo required outfitters to hire comparatively large crews of skilled shipmates. Whereas a typical West Indiamen that measured 250-300 tons generally mustered a captain, one or two mates, a cooper, a cook and 15-20 seamen, the same ship carrying enslaved Africans would enroll an additional 20 men as coastal traders, craftsmen or guards.
10 Contracts between owners and captains could also make explicit the many tasks captains were expected to perform. Postma (1990) reprints the contract for captains sailing ships for the Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, a Dutch slave trading company. To summarize the responsibilities in the contract, captains should 1) sail to the African coast as quickly as possible, 2) purchase high quality slaves, 3) not be attacked by the slaves, 4) make sure the slaves are not mistreated by the crew, 5) make sure the slaves are treated well and taken care of by the doctor, and 6) properly brand the slaves so as not to badly injure them. markets in the Americas where they would sell slaves.
Once a voyage departed Europe, a captain's knowledge and experience of navigation and sailing began to play a role. According to Thomas (1997) , French captains were required to take exams before commanding a slave ship. Captains often carried libraries of books on maritime techniques. Better sailing expertise meant faster arrival to the Americas and less risk for slaves dying on board. Hogerzeil and Richardson (2007) show that survival rates for slaves, in particular male slaves, dropped significantly when the number of days sailing went beyond 100. Rawley Captains also played an important role in determining the overall hygiene conditions on the ship (Rawley 1981) , which impacted slave and crew mortality rates during the voyage. Even if a ship carried a doctor on board, captains exerted influence over hygiene by virtue of rank, i.e. they oversaw the doctor's operations and influenced the doctor's ability to provide care to both slaves and crew.
11 Rawley (1981) notes, for example, captains were responsible for the doctor receiving any needed medical supplies through their role in determining the ship's provisions. Similarly, if a captain understood the role of air ventilation in fostering cleanliness, it would lead to better practices on board, which helped slaves survive the Middle Passage.
Harms (2002) notes captains were responsible for rationing food and water. Behrendt (1991) cites the importance of a captain's knowledge related to maritime and tropical diseases and their treatments. Captains' decisions regarding ship crowding could be fatal. For example, Solar and Duquette (2017) show a one standard deviation increase in crowding was associated with an increase of between 4.9 and 6.2 percentage points in slave mortality on British slave ships.
Maintaining crew discipline and obedience from the slaves provided additional obstacles for the captain's management of a slave voyage (Harms 2002) . Behrendt (1991, p. 103 ) cites the memoirs of Hugh Crow, a captain in the British slave trade, as evidence for why some captains might not maintain their command on subsequent voyages. Speaking of a Captain Gilbert Rigby, Crow writes Rigby "had neither the firmness nor the tact to keep others in subjection" and that his crew became insubordinate. Slave rebellion was always a possibility, but better captains had knowledge of which slaves, or mix of slaves, were more prone to violence and rebellion and could adjust the ship's security accordingly. Rawley (1981, p. 298) , reporting on a Captain James
Fraser, notes this skill: "...he seldom confined Angola slaves, 'being very peaceable,' took off the handcuffs of Windward and Gold Coast slaves as soon as the ship was out of sight of land, and soon after that the leg irons, but Bonny slaves, whom he thought vicious, were kept under stricter confinement."
Data
Our data on slave ship owners come from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, which resides online at http://www.slavevoyages.org. The data consist of information on 34,948 voyages between the years 1514 and 1866 and are widely used by historians and economics historians in their study of the African slave trades. Eltis and Richardson (2010) provides a useful visual summary in the form of an atlas. We only consider those voyages for Great Britain and France during the 1700s, because these voyages have the best coverage in the data. We drop those observations with only the owner's last name. Different owners may still have the same first and last names. There is no perfect way to completely solve this problem. One potential problem is that different owners with the same first and last name appear in years that are very far apart.
In our final sample, only 6% (2%) and 5% (1%) of the owners in Great Britain and France have first and last appearances in the data that are 30 (40) years apart.
We exploit the richness of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database to construct the variables in our data. The variable tonnage measures the ship's tonnage, or size. This is the unstandardized tonnage alluded to during our discussion of Solar and Duquette (2017) Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of appearances of owners in our data. A significant portion of owners appear only once in the data. We see multiple appearances of owners more often in Great Britain than in France, with the average number of appearance being 4.90 (with a standard deviation of 17.65) in the former and 2.97 (with a standard deviation of 8.06) in the latter. As we show in the following section, we use within-owner variation to identify the capital and labor share in the production function, so we only include those voyages with owners that appear in the data at least three times. The average number of appearances in the resulting sample is 12.22 (with a standard deviation of 15.67) in Great Britain and 8.35 (with a standard deviation of 14.35) in France. Overall, the voyages in the final sample are very similar to the dropped voyages in terms of sizes and owners' characteristics. In both countries, the capital and labor inputs (ship tonnage and crew size) are close in magnitude between the final sample and the dropped samples. The outputs, however, are slightly higher in the final sample, indicating that the productivity of voyages in the final sample are slightly higher than voyages with missing information or whose owners appear less than three times in the data. These patterns are the same if instead we use the variable tonmod for ship tonnage, which is the standardized tonnage alluded to in our discussion of Solar and Duquette (2017) Owners in some ports tend to appear more times than owners in other ports. A significant portion of London owners appeared only once in the data and were dropped in the final sample.
Owners in Liverpool and Bristol, thus, represent a larger portion in the final sample than in the original sample. Also, most French owners in ports other than the three main slaving ports (Lorient, Nantes, and Saint-Malo) are also dropped because of missing information or limited appearance in the data. Owners in the three main French ports represent the majority share (77%) of all voyages in the final sample.
Empirical Model and Results

Owner Value-Added to Voyage Output
In order to measure the owner's contribution to slave voyage output, we follow Dalton and Leung (2015) to adopt a Lucas span-of-control approach (Lucas 1978) by assuming the following production function for each voyage i financed by owner j at time t:
14 where Y * ijt is the number of slaves disembarked in the Americas, Φ j is the owner's managerial input or value-added (assumed constant over time), K it is capital, and L it is the number of crew, all for voyage i.
13 α and β, with 0 < α + β < 1, represent the shares of capital and labor in production, which we will assume constant across voyages due to data constraints. A it is unadjusted TFP. We only observe a voyage's ship tonnageK it in the data, which is a proxy for the voyage's total capital K it . As in Dalton and Leung (2015) , the manipulations in (1) show how we adjust ship tonnage by the factor η and incorporate the owner's effect to arrive at our final production function for disembarked slaves in terms of ship tonnage, number of crew, and
The whole point of our approach will be to use the structure provided by the production function in equation (1) Returning to our procedure, we first use the information on the names of owners to identify a unique owner. We can then take log and rewrite equation (1) as
where we now include δ t as a time dummy. The residual (µ ijt ) is assumed to be composed of the owner's value-added (Φ j ) and an idiosyncratic voyage effect that varies across voyages and over time ( ijt ).
14 13 We assume that slaves disembarked are homogeneous goods. In general, this is, of course, not true. For instance, both male and female slaves were exported. But, in our data, the average proportion of male slaves exported is approximately 0.63 for the two countries studied, with a standard deviation of below 0.1.
14 Similar to equation (2) in which α and β are estimated separately, we also use a second method that makes use of historical estimates on labor and capital shares in the slave trade to estimate the production function, which is similar to the approach adopted in Dalton and Leung (2015) :
whereᾱ and 1 −ᾱ represent historical estimates on capital and labor shares and γ is the so called span-of-control parameter governing the returns to scale. The historical estimates of capital and labor shares are taken from Eltis and Richardson (1995) . The main results are very similar and, thus, are not reported here. Interested readers can contact the authors for this set of results.
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The data allows us to observe the performance of an owner in each of his voyages. We follow previous literature (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014, Kane and to construct an unbiased estimator of Φ j . The controls (lnK it and ln L it ) and ijt may be correlated with Φ j .
We, therefore, construct the estimator in three steps. We first regress log slave voyage output on the observables and, then, compute the output residuals adjusting for observables. Next, we construct the best linear predictor of mean output residuals in year t based on mean output residuals in prior years. Finally, we use the coefficients of the best linear predictor to predict each owner's value-added at time t. We now describe these steps formally.
First, we regress ln Y * ijt on lnK it and ln L it , with owner fixed effects and time fixed effects, to compute the log output residuals adjusting for observables. In particular, we estimate α and β using an OLS regression of the form
where τ j is an owner fixed effect. The residuals of slave voyage output, after adjusting for observables, are
We only include observations in which the owner appears in our data at least three times to allow for enough within-owner observation. 15 We, thus, estimate α and β using within owner variation. Because it is natural to think that owner value-added is correlated with lnK it and ln L it , estimates of α and β in a specification without owner fixed effects would overstate the importance of the controls. As table 3 shows, the estimates are somewhat different between specifications with and without owner fixed effects.
Second, we follow Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) 's approach to construct the empirical Bayes estimate of owner value-added. Indeed, our estimator is also similar to the one in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008) and and the special case in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) , in which value-added is constant over time. 16 The empirical Bayes estimate is a best linear predictor of the random owner effect in equation (2). The intuition of the approach is to form a weighted average using a noisy estimate of owner value-added (such as the mean of the residual outputs over owner j's career,
, where n j is the total number of voyages financed by owner j) and the mean of the residual outputs of all owners in the country
, with the weight on the former being its "reliability" (which is the ratio of signal variance to signal variance plus noise variance) and the weight on the latter being 1 minus the reliability. With fewer observations per owner, the noise variance would increase, and, thus, the reliability estimate would shrink back toward lnȲ .
We construct our estimator in the following steps:
1. We estimate the variance of the owner (Φ j ) and voyage ( ijt ) components of the residual (µ ijt ) from equation (2). The within-owner-5-year-period variance in µ ijt was used as an estimate of the variance of the voyage component:
whereμ jt is the owner's mean residual. The variance of the owner component is the difference between the total variance of ln Y it (V ar(ln Y it )) and the estimate of the voyage component:σ
2. We construct an empirical Bayes estimator of each owner's value-added by multiplying the mean residual outputs over owner j's career (lnȲ j = 
ψ represents the shrinkage factor and reflects the reliability of lnȲ j as an estimate of Φ j . France. In Britain, the mean of the value-added estimates is 2.343, with a standard deviation of 0.075. The means of the value-added estimates are 2.355, 2.342, and 2.330 in Bristol, Liverpool and London, respectively. As mentioned in Section 4.1, using the standardized tonnage variable to redo the analysis should decrease the owner value-added estimates, which is what we find.
Owner Value-Added Estimates
When using standardized tonnage, the mean of the value-added estimates in Britain is 1.969, with a standard deviation of 0.069. Similarly, the means of the value-added estimates drop to 1.98, 1.96, and 1.99 in Bristol, Liverpool and London. 
.6 France
In France, the mean of the value-added estimates is 1.410, with a standard deviation of 0.099.
Among the French ports, Saint-Malo owners have the highest value-added (1.435), followed by Nantes (1.395) and Lorient (1.183). When using standardized tonnage, the mean of the valueadded estimates in France is 0.726, with a standard deviation of 0.081. The means of the value-added estimates drop to 0.755, 0.719, and 0.567 in Saint-Malo, Nantes, and Lorient.
In both Great Britain and France, we observe a large spread in terms of owner value-added.
We also see a significant number of owners that appear to have extremely low value-added, which can be seen in the long left tails in the distributions in Figure 3 . One possible interpretation of these left tails is the lack of competition in the slave trade industry prevented low performing owners from being forced from the market, as discussed in Section 2.1.
As a robustness check on whether the estimates of owner value-added measure the performance of the owners, we regressΦ on three such performance measures. These include 1) the level of crowding, which is the number of slaves on board at departure from last slaving port per ship ton;
17 2) the rate of mortality, which is the ratio of slave deaths between Africa and the Americas (which is reported as the variable sladvoy in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database)
to the total slaves on board at departure from last slaving port; and 3) purchase time per slaves, which is defined as the number of days between the beginning and end of the slave purchasing process divided by the number of slaves on board at departure from last slaving port. a Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Table 4 reports the results from the regressions. All estimates onΦ have the right sign. HigherΦ is associated with higher level of crowding (loading more slaves on board per ton), lower mortality rate, and shorter purchasing time per slave. The higher crowding and lower mortality results suggest higher value-added owners were able to provide instructions and/or ships to load as many slaves on board as possible while maintaining lower mortality rates.
Variation in managerial quality across owners mattered significantly for the total number of slaves exported during the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Table 5 documents the impact on slave exports from the variation in owner value-added. In order to show the significance of the variation in owner ability, we replace all voyage owners in each country by the 10th, 20th, 30th,..., and 90th percentile owner based on the ordering of the coefficients on the owners' value-added estimates. We then compare the estimated number of slave exports under these counterfactual owners with the actual number of slave exports in the data. We only report the 10th and 90th
percentile results, along with the 90/10 ratio.
The variation in owner value-added to slave voyage output is slightly higher in France than in Great Britain. In Great Britain, slave exports increase by slightly more than 7% under the 90th percentile owner, but the decrease in slave exports under the 10th percentile owner is a little less than 7%, with a 90/10 ratio of 1.16. With a 90/10 ratio at 1.21, French slave exports would increase by 9% under the 90th percentile owner but would decrease by 9% under the 10th percentile owner. The 90/10 ratios are slightly smaller when using standardized tonnage as the capital input.
These magnitudes are significant. In the case of the 90th percentile owner, the estimated slave exports imply 15,758 and 7,371 more slaves would have been exported from Africa each decade on average during the British and French slave trades. Summing these averages over the decades for which we have estimates translates into nearly 217,000 more slaves exported during the combined slave trade of Great Britain and France in the 18th century. This number drops to 186,000 when using standardized tonnage as the capital input. Our sample only represents 56%
of the recorded slaves exported by the British and French during the 18th century, which means, if our estimates are unbiased, the number of slaves exported under the 90th percentile owner would be nearly double. These results suggest owners played a significant role in determining how many slaves arrived in the Americas during the trans-Atlantic slave trades.
Owner Value-Added, Competition, and Family Business
The existence of variation in owner value-added, despite the fact that we already control for labor, capital, and other controls, begs the question of why this variation persists. As in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), we test the effects of two factors, competition and family ownership, on owner value-added. As discussed in Section 2.1, both mercantilist policies reducing competition and the importance of family networks for financing slave voyages served as barriers to entry in the slave trade. The presence of these market inefficiencies may have an effect on owner value-added by influencing the pool of owners or the incentives for effort.
Competition: We consider two categories of variables. The first is the competition among owners in a decade. We use two alternative measures for this competition. One is the number of competing owners in a decade. Another one is the Herfindahl index using market shares of owners in a decade. The second category of variable is the availability of captains. We use the ratio of the number of captains to the number of owners in a decade as our measure.
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Owners' Controls: We also include a vector of owner characteristics as controls. These include dummies of the Royal African Company (in the case of Great Britain), owners being a company, family business, captains being family members, and the number of owners of the voyage. Table 6 reports the summary statistics of the owners' and competition controls. The Royal
African Company owned only a small share (0.4%) of British voyages in the 18th century, with 18 We also construct these competition measures based on a 5-year period. Results are similar.
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all of them concentrated in the first three decades. A significant portion of the voyages were owned by companies (32% in Great Britain and 25% in France). Family business was more prevalent in the British slave trade than in the French, with 8.1% of British voyages and 1.4%
French voyages owned by family businesses. British owners were also more likely to hire family members to be voyage captains (11%) than were French owners (2.2%).
Competition was more intense in Great Britain than in France, which is consistent with the historical background described in Section 2. On average, each British owner would be competing with 110 other owners in a decade, while each French owner would be competing with 95 other owners in the same time period. The market was a bit more concentrated in France (0.05) than in Britain (0.04). The relative supply of captains in Great Britain was also higher than in France. On average, there would be 1.76 captains for each British owner compared to 1.43 captains for each French owner in a decade. Table 7 reports the regression result when we regress our owner value-added estimates on the competition levels and the various owners' characteristics. Columns 1 to 4 report the regression results for Great Britain, while columns 5 to 8 report the results for France. The first two columns for each country report the results without port dummies, while the last two columns for each country report the results with port dummies. Several results emerge.
First, owner value-added tends to be higher when competition among owners are more intense in some specifications. When port fixed effects are included, a one standard deviation increase in the market concentration (HHI) is associated with a decrease in owner value-added by 0.12 standard deviation and 0.82 standard deviation in Great Britain and in France. In France, one standard deviation increase in the number of competitors is associated with an increase in owner's value-added by 0.17 standard deviation.
Second, the availability of captains correlates negatively with owner value-added estimates in Great Britain and France. But, in both countries, the correlations between the owner valueadded estimates and captains' availability are small in magnitude.
Third, owners being a family business has a negative correlation with the owner valueadded estimates. If the owner is in a family business in Britain, the owner's value-added would decrease by approximately 0.20 standard deviation. While it is not statistically significant, a
French family business's value-added would be 0.22 to 0.24 standard deviation lower than non- a Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
family business. Also, if the French owner hired a family member as the captain, the owner's value-added would be lower by 1.15 standard deviation.
Fourth, owner value-added tends to increase when the owner is part of a company, except in the case of the Royal African Company. The negative correlation between owner valueadded and the Royal African Company is consistent with our discussion in Section 2.1 about mercantilist policies insulating firms from competition and, thus, decreasing owner value-added.
The positive effect of competition among owners might work through a selection mechanism in which worse owners exit the market. To look at this mechanism, we test whether higher levels of competition among owners are associated with a reduction in the dispersion in the owners' value-added (as suggested by Syverson (2004a Syverson ( , 2004b . We regress the level of dispersion (defined as the interquartile difference in owner value-added in a five-year period in the country) on our competition measures and find that owner-level competition has a negative marginal effect on dispersion. When the number of competing owners was used, the coefficient was -0.120 with a standard error of 0.069. When HHI was used, the coefficient was 1.466 with a standard error of 0.137.
Robustness Check on the Effect of Competition on Owner ValueAdded
There might be concern that the relationship between owner value-added and competition is not causal. We attempt to tackle this problem by examining the effect of the outbreak of the Seven
Years' War between Great Britain and France on owner value-added. Stein (1979) provides a detailed historical description of the war's effect on the slave trade, which we summarize here.
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We then regress these owners' value-added estimates on a dummy of post Seven Years' War and the other owner controls used in Table 7 . As columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 show, after 19 Notice the competition as a result of the Seven Years' War is slightly different from our other measures of competition in the paper, which have all been measurements from strictly within a country. 20 We vary the periods before and after the Seven Years' War from 7 years to 14 years, 14 years being the maximum period considered because the post-Seven Years' War period then stretches to the beginning of the American Revolutionary War. Results are similar. 21 We understand the British may not be a perfect control group for the French, but data limitations prevent us from using an alternative nation as a control group. For example, only one Dutch and one Portuguese owner can be identified between the years 1747 and 1773 with the necessary coverage of the variables needed to perform our estimation. 
Captain's Contribution to Voyage Output
One approach to assess the captain's contribution to voyage output is to ask what is the difference in the owner value-added estimates had captains been randomly assigned to owners and voyages in our data. In order to assess this, we follow the approach in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) to estimate forecast bias by regressing predicted outputs based on observables excluded from the value-added model on value-added estimates. These observables (P * it ) include variables on captains' characteristics such as a captain's experience, the ratio of captains to owners (a proxy for captains' availability in the market), and a dummy on whether the captain is a family member of the owner. Note that while this is called forecast bias in the literature, it is not a bias in our context, because it is the owner's responsibility to find a good captain. 23 The estimation of our "forecast bias" is done in the following way.
First, we regress the output residuals ln Y it on the vector P * it and our baseline controls to obtain residual captain characteristics P it .
We then regress ln Y it on P it , including owner fixed effects:
and construct predicted values ln Y p it =ρP it . We then regress ln Y p it onΦ j , including time fixed effects as before. The degree of forecast bias due to selection on captain characteristics are 2% in Great Britain and 25% in France.
Another approach to assess the captain's contribution is to estimate and analyze captain value-added to the slave trade. We follow the same sample data selection process we used for the owner's analysis described in Section 3. In particular, we first drop the observations with missing information on ship tonnage, crew size, or slaves disembarked. We also drop voyages in which captains appear in the data less than three times. However, because a significant portion of French captains appeared only once, and less than 50 French captains appeared at least three times in the data (see right panel of Figure 4 ), we only do the analysis for British captains. This leaves us with 3675 British voyages and 757 unique captains. Among these 757 British captains, the average number of appearances in the final sample is 4.587, with a standard deviation of 2.159.
We then follow the same procedure described before to estimate captain value-added to slave voyage output. In particular, we first run an OLS regression of ln Y * ijt on lnK it and ln L it with (4). 24 The resulting estimates of the capital share (α) and labor share (β) are 0.387 and 0.281 (with standard errors being 0.026 and 0.024), which are slightly smaller than those obtained from the owner's analysis.
We then construct our value-added estimator for captains by decomposing the variance of the error terms in the OLS regression, as described in equations (6)- (8). Figure 5 shows the distribution of the value-added estimates of British captains. The mean of the value-added estimates is 3.07, with a standard deviation of 0.10. The means of the value-added estimates are 3.04, 3.11, and 3.02 in Bristol, Liverpool and London, respectively. As in the distribution of the owners' value-added estimates, the left tail of the value-added distribution is rather long, indicating the survival of bad captains in the industry. When using standardized tonnage, the mean of the value-added estimates is 2.67, with a standard deviation of 0.15. The means of the value-added estimates drop to 2.62, 2.72, and 2.59 in Bristol, Liverpool and London. Table 10 reports the variation in captain value-added to slave voyage output. Overall, the variation in captain value-added is higher than that of owner value-added, with a 90/10 ratio of 1.22. If all voyages were piloted by the 90th percentile captain, the estimated number of slaves exported during the British slave trade would be 21,099 higher each decade on average, nearly 211,000 more slaves exported over the course of the 18th century. This number increases to 269,000 when using standardized tonnage as the capital input. The 90/10 ratio also increases 24 Of course, j refers to the captain here instead of the owner. a Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
to 1.28. Table 11 reports the regression results when we regress the captains' value-added estimates on the competition and owners' controls. Several results emerge.
First, family business and captain value-added are negatively correlated. If the owner of the voyage was part of a family business, the captain value-added is lower by 0.1 to 0.4 standard deviation. If the captain worked for his family, the captain's value-added is lower by 0.14 standard deviation, but the correlation is not statistically significant.
Second, if a captain worked for a company, instead of individual owner, the captain's valueadded is lower by approximately 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviation, but the correlation is not statistically significant when port dummies are included.
Third, if a captain worked for the Royal African Company, the captain's value-added is lower by approximately 1.3 standard deviation.
Fourth, the correlation between the level of competition and captain value-added is not clear.
When the number of competing captains increase by 1 standard deviation, it is associated with an increase in captain value-added by 0.2 to 0.4 standard deviation. However, when market concentration increases by 1 standard deviation, it is associated with an increase in captain value-added by 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviation.
Conclusion
Managerial quality during the trans-Atlantic slave trade was no less important to the structure and outcomes of the industry than the role played by modern-day managers on contemporary issues, such as the firm size distribution, typically studied by economists. Our paper quantifies the impact of management, in the form of a owner and captain value-added to slave voyage output, on the number of slaves exported during the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Slave exports increase (decrease) by 7% (7%) and 9% (9%) under the 90th (10th) percentile owners in the cases of Great Britain and France, respectively, while slave exports increase (decrease) by 10% (10%) under the 90th (10th) percentile captains in Great Britain. We also find that value-added of owners and captains are strongly associated with family business and market structure. To determine whether competition's effect on owner value-added might be causal, we exploit the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. The war changed the market sizes and, thus, levels of competition in the British and French slave trades. Our results support the idea of a causal link between competition and owner value-added. Overall, our results are important for economic historians of the African slave trades, because they show taking into account the role played by owners and captains is crucially important for understanding voyage-level outcomes.
